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Should consent for data processing be
privileged in health research? A
comparative legal analysis
Edward S. Dove* and Jiahong Chen**
Introduction
Several recently drafted data protection laws appear to
afford a privileged position to scientific research, in-
cluding health research. Provisions that might otherwise
apply to data subjects and data controllers, including
rights exercisable by data subjects against controllers,
are lifted or lessened. For example, the EU’s General
Data Protection Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR)1 defines
scientific research broadly, stating that:
. . . the processing of personal data for scientific research
purposes should be interpreted in a broad manner includ-
ing for example technological development and demonstra-
tion, fundamental research, applied research and privately
funded research. [. . .] Scientific research purposes should
also include studies conducted in the public interest in the
area of public health.2
The GDPR grants some exemptions from its require-
ments when personal data are processed for scientific
research purposes.3 Provided appropriate safeguards are
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in place and processing for scientific research has a basis
in EU or Member State law, researchers can, among
other things, keep health-related data stored for a long
time, refuse to delete personal data even if the data sub-
ject withdraws their consent for participating in the re-
search project, and use data from one research project
for others.4 Scientific research, it seems, faces a lighter
data protection regulatory touch than would apply to
other data processing activities, such as processing for
commercial or marketing purposes. The policy rationale
is that data protection law should protect the funda-
mental rights of data subjects but also facilitate scientific
research and medical innovation to improve health and
well-being.5 By treating data processing for scientific re-
search (eg biobanking, genomic research, epidemiologi-
cal research) as equivalent to data processing for
banking or digital marketing, citizens would suffer from
slower research breakthroughs and translational re-
search discoveries that bring new diagnostics, drugs,
and devices to market.
At the same time, it should not be assumed that
processing personal data for non-health research pur-
poses faces an insurmountable legal barrier in the EU or
other jurisdictions. Data protection laws are drafted, af-
ter all, with a view to balancing the need for protecting
the fundamental rights of data subjects with the need
for enabling the free flow of data within and across
jurisdictions to facilitate economic development, pro-
tect national security, and promote general well-being.6
A common misperception of modern data protection
law, for example, is that data subject consent is a legal
obligation for the controller to process the subject’s per-
sonal data. In other words, if a controller does not have
a data subject’s consent to process their personal data,
such processing is forbidden. In many countries, how-
ever, this is not the case. Instead, consent is but one of
several ‘lawful bases’ to process personal data;7 if there
is an alternative lawful basis that a data controller can
rely upon (eg compliance with a legal obligation to
which the controller is subject), then consent of the data
subject is not obligatory to process their personal data.
However, when it comes to considering whether con-
sent should serve as the lawful basis for processing data
in the health research context—that is, whether consent
and only consent should be the basis for processing—a
fair degree of policy and regulatory divergence emerges.
This divergence seems to stem from a normative link
that some draw between consent as a research ethics
principle and consent as a lawful basis in data protec-
tion law. The normative claim goes that because re-
search participants are often asked to consent before
they participate in many (but certainly not all) types of
health research studies, either on the basis of ethical
principle (eg grounded in autonomy) or legal rule (eg
an obligation for clinical trials), it would seem ethical,
sensible, and practical to also ask them for their consent
prior to processing their data. Not all scholars and poli-
cymakers agree with this position, though; a counterar-
gument is that research ethics consent and data
processing consent should not be conflated for ethical,
legal, and methodological reasons. Moreover, for public
organizations, consent is sometimes not a proper legiti-
mate basis for data processing for research.8 Thus, the
counterargument’s main claim is consent may be appro-
priate as the lawful basis for processing data in a health
research project, but it is context-dependent and should
not be made an absolute requirement.
This divergence regarding the role of consent in
health research is evident when looking at the legal
landscape of several jurisdictions. In some, the privileges
afforded to health research are readily apparent; in
others, they seem to dissipate if not disappear. For ex-
ample, we find that the GDPR establishes a regulatory
framework with no apparent bias towards consent—in
the scientific research context or otherwise. Whether
one is processing (regular) personal data or sensitive
data such as health data and genetic data, the GDPR
does not mandate an organization to obtain the data
subject’s consent: other lawful grounds to process data
are permitted. But we also find that Member States
within the EU or other countries with data protection
laws inspired by the GDPR can impose a stricter regime
than the GDPR. For example, Ireland’s Health Research
Regulations 2018 stipulate that a data controller propos-
ing to process or further process personal data for the
purposes of health research must do so on the basis of
explicit consent, or otherwise apply to a special commit-
tee for a declaration that the public interest in carrying
out the research significantly outweighs the public inter-
est in requiring the explicit consent of the data subject.
4 Edward Dove, ‘The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Implications
for International Scientific Research in the Digital Era’ (2018) 46(4) J L
Med & Ethics 1013–30. See also Maria Luisa Manis, ‘The Processing of
Personal Data in the Context of Scientific Research. The New Regime un-
der the EU-GDPR’ (2017) 3 BioLaw Journal-Rivista di BioDiritto
325–54.
5 Jessica Bell and others, ‘Balancing Data Subjects’ Rights and Public
Interest Research: Examining the Interplay between UK Law, EU Human
Rights Law and the GDPR’ (2019) 5(1) Eur Data Protect L Rev 43–53.
6 See GDPR, Recitals 4-6.
7 Art 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/
679, p 4.
8 Health Research Authority, ‘Consent in Research’, available at <https://
www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-leg
islation/data-protection-and-information-governance/gdpr-guidance/
what-law-says/consent-research/> last accessed 5 December 2019.
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Less strictly, South Africa’s Protection of Personal
Information Act, 2013 (POPIA) affords consent a privi-
leged role in the research context. Namely, health data
for research purposes must be processed on the basis of
data subject consent unless (i) the research purpose
serves a public interest and the processing is necessary
for the purpose concerned; or (ii) it appears to be im-
possible or would involve a disproportionate effort to
ask for consent. Somewhat similarly, the United
Kingdom’s Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018) stipu-
lates that consent for processing sensitive data for re-
search purposes is not required provided that it is
carried out in accordance with Article 89(1) of the
GDPR (as supplemented by section 19 of the DPA
2018) and is in the public interest.
Ultimately, what do these variations in national laws
regarding the role of data processing consent mean for
health research? Is data protection regulatory divergence
detrimental for international research collaboration?
Might we see regulatory arbitrage emerge where health
research is conducted more frequently and extensively
in jurisdictions that are viewed as more research friendly
from a data protection law standpoint? Should data
controllers opt for (explicit) consent as the most suit-
able lawful basis to process data for health research, or,
given the concerns some express about consent as the
lawful basis for data processing in a good number of
health research studies, might alternative legal grounds
be afforded more weight? And what role, if any, should
the public interest have to play in this assessment?
As many of these laws have only recently been
drafted, now is an opportune time to consider the role
of consent in processing data for health research. We do
so in this article by conducting a comparative analysis
of several recently enacted laws governing data protec-
tion. We first look at the EU GDPR. Under this frame-
work, the requirements for a valid consent are
sufficiently stringent (including in relation to consent
being ‘freely given’) that it has been suggested, at least
in relation to clinical trials,9 that consent is not the
most appropriate legal basis (under Article 6) or the
most appropriate exception for processing special cate-
gory data (under Article 9). Researchers are likely to
gravitate towards provisions that allow for processing
personal data on grounds other than consent, such
Articles 9(2)(j) and 89(1). But, as we will argue, Article
89(1) allows for a bias towards consent within Member
State law. Such bias may be exhibited in a number of
ways. National laws, either implementing the GDPR or
inspired by it, therefore, provide points of comparison.
Regulatory favouritism towards consent may exhibit in
various forms mirrored in South Africa’s POPIA, the
UK’s DPA 2018, and Ireland’s Health Research
Regulations 2018, the latter two of which are Member
State-specific supplements to the GDPR.
Upon analysing these laws (along with other relevant
laws and regulations that also govern health research),
we then argue that there is some merit in privileging
data processing consent, but that this nevertheless
should be distinguished from research ethics consent
for reasons of conceptual clarity. We come to advocate
a middle-ground approach in data protection law for
health research, which tacks closest to South Africa’s
POPIA approach, ie one that does not mandate consent
as the lawful basis for processing personal data for
health research—but does strongly encourage it—and,
in the absence of consent as the lawful basis, requires a
public interest justification or justification of impracti-
cability of obtaining consent if one is to avail themselves
of advantageous research exemptions. As we will argue,
this approach achieves the best balance for protecting
data subject/research participant rights and interests
and promoting socially valuable health research. In this
article, we confine our analysis to the more common
(or standard) scenario of an adult with capacity where
data are being collected for research use in the future.
We do not address other scenarios, such as secondary
use of previously collected personal data, or research
and data processing involving adults lacking capacity or
children.10
We begin our assessment by looking at the GDPR as
an overarching regulatory framework before turning to
a comparative analysis of the POPIA, the DPA 2018,
and Ireland’s Health Research Regulations 2018,
respectively.
The GDPR as overarching regulatory
framework
The GDPR took full legal effect across the European
Union (EU) on 25 May 2018, and subsequently, the
European Economic Area (EEA). It has a number of
implications for health research involving the collection,
use, and cross-border sharing of people’s personal data
(it does not, however, override pre-GDPR laws in
Member States governing health research provided
9 European Data Protection Board (EDPB), Opinion 3/2019 concerning the
Questions and Answers on the interplay between the Clinical Trials
Regulation (CTR) and the General Data Protection regulation (GDPR)
(2019).
10 For discussion of these scenarios, see Mary Donnelly and Maeve
McDonagh, ‘Health Research, Consent and the GDPR Exemption’
(2019) 26(2) Eur J Health L 97–119.
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those laws do not contravene the GDPR rules). The
GDPR seeks to change the ways in which organizations
both within and outside Europe collect, use, and share
personal data. The GDPR regulates the processing activ-
ities of two key actors—(i) data controllers, meaning
persons or entities that determine the purposes and
means of processing personal data, eg companies,
researchers, universities, and (ii) data processors, which
refers to persons or entities that process personal data
on behalf of a data controller, eg cloud providers and
research collaborators, in many circumstances. The
GDPR protects and promotes the data protection rights
of data subjects, who in the health research context are
most likely to be research participants.
Under the GDPR, processing of personal data is law-
ful only if one has a lawful basis. The six permissive law-
ful bases are stipulated in Article 6, of which consent is
but one (Article 6(1)(a)): ‘Processing shall be lawful
only if and to the extent that at least one of the follow-
ing applies: [. . .] the data subject has given consent to
the processing of his or her personal data for one or
more specific purposes.’ The GDPR defines consent as
‘any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous
indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or
she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, sig-
nifies agreement to the processing of personal data relat-
ing to him or her’.11 Article 6 should be read in light of
Recital 50, which states that further processing for ‘sci-
entific research’ purposes (which would include health
research purposes) should be considered to be a com-
patible processing operation that requires no further or
separate lawful basis.
While consent is one basis for processing, there are
also other bases. And, indeed, where scientific research
is carried out as a secondary purpose by the same data
controller, then no further lawful basis is needed.12 The
GDPR does not privilege consent as a lawful basis in the
scientific research context. Other, potentially more use-
ful, lawful bases under GDPR Article 6 include legiti-
mate interests (foremost applicable to commercial
organizations) and tasks carried out in the public inter-
est, the basis of which must be laid down by EU law or
Member State law to which the controller is subject.
Given this, several regulatory authorities, including the
UK’s Health Research Authority, recommend that
researchers process personal data on a lawful basis other
than consent.13
Moreover, under the GDPR, certain kinds of per-
sonal data are considered ‘special’—in other words, sen-
sitive—and therefore deserving of even greater legal
protection. Whereas with (regular) personal data, proc-
essing is lawful only where there is a lawful basis under
Article 6, with special categories of data, processing is
generally prohibited and will only be permitted if the
processor meets one of 10 special category conditions
(ie exceptions) listed in Article 9(2). What this means is
that, at least according to common interpretation, proc-
essing ‘special categories’ of personal data requires two
conditions: (1) the processing must have a lawful basis,
ie one of the six lawful bases outlined in Article 6, and
(2) it must fall within at least one of the 10 exceptions
specified in Article 9(2).14 A crucial consideration when
processing ‘special categories’ of personal data under
the GDPR such as genetic data and health data is the
condition under Article 9(2)(j) that allows these data to
be processed on the grounds of scientific research pur-
poses, based on EU or Member State law and in accor-
dance with Article 89(1). Processing these data on the
grounds of scientific research purposes can enable
organizations to work around the obligation to secure
data subjects’ ‘explicit consent’ for processing, which is
an alternative condition under Article 9(2)(a).15
Thus, whether processing (regular) personal data or
special category personal data such as genetic data and
health data, the GDPR does not mandate an organiza-
tion to obtain the data subject’s consent. Indeed, the
requirements for a valid consent under the GDPR are
sufficiently stringent (including in relation to consent
being ‘freely given’) such that it has been suggested, at
least in relation to clinical trials,16 that consent is not
the most appropriate legal basis (under Article 6) or the
most appropriate exception (under Article 9). Instead,
researchers are likely to gravitate towards Articles
9(2)(j) and 89(1). This flexible approach allows for a
good deal of research promotion and medical innova-
tion, but also, as we discuss below, arguably carries
some drawbacks.
While there is a theoretical possibility that a control-
ler might conduct health research directly under the
safeguard requirements of GDPR Article 89(1), one
11 GDPR, Art 4(11).
12 GDPR, Recital 50. See also GDPR, Art 5(1)(b).
13 Health Research Authority, ‘GDPR Guidance,’ available at <https://
www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-leg
islation/data-protection-and-information-governance/gdpr-guidance/>
last accessed 5 December 2019.
14 Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), ‘Guide to the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)’, available at <https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protec
tion-regulation-gdpr/> last accessed 5 December 2019 p 87.
15 However, it is argued that this is presumably not the intention of the
legislators. See Ka¨rt Pormeister, ‘Genetic Data and the Research
Exemption: Is the GDPR Going Too Far?’ (2017) 7(2) Int Data Privacy L
137–46.
16 See n 9 above.
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would expect that most, if not at all, Member States
have specific legislation governing the use of personal
data in the context of health research. Some of this legis-
lation has long pre-dated the GDPR, as will be discussed
in the section on the UK. And, as we will see, the GDPR
allows Member States the ability to legislate at the na-
tional level in certain areas, including processing of per-
sonal data for scientific research purposes. This
flexibility has already led to regulatory divergence in the
EU and EEA, including in some instances a tamping
down on the ability to process personal data for health
research on a lawful basis other than consent. More spe-
cifically, Article 89(1) GDPR allows for a bias towards
consent within Member State law. Such a bias may be
exhibited in a number of ways. National laws, either un-
der the GDPR or inspired by it, provide points of com-
parison. We now turn to this.
A comparative legal analysis
South Africa’s Protection of Personal
Information Act, 2013 (POPIA)
The Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA)
was adopted by South Africa in 2013, but the actual
date for its entry into full force is yet to be announced
at the time of writing. While certain provisions of the
POPIA took effect in 2014 to enable the establishment
of the Information Regulator, the main body of the Act
is not yet in force.17 The GDPR (specifically, earlier iter-
ations of the law) has had influence on the drafting of
the POPIA.18 In the context of health research, the
POPIA governs the processing of personal information
for research; it is intended to complement already-
existing ethics guidelines for conducting health re-
search,19 though the extent that it does so insofar as
permitting ‘broad consent’ is concerned has been called
into question.20
Apart from the general rules on processing of per-
sonal data, the POPIA sets out additional restrictions on
the use of ‘special personal information’.21 Such special
categories of personal information include those con-
cerning a data subject’s ‘religious or philosophical
beliefs, race or ethnic origin, trade union membership,
political persuasion, health or sex life or biometric
information’ or ‘criminal behaviour’.22 Processing of
such personal information is generally prohibited, un-
less legitimized by one of the exemptions provided by
Section 27. In addition, Sections 28 to 33 provide fur-
ther derogations regarding specific types of special per-
sonal information.
The five general legal bases (ie exemptions) provided
by Section 27 include: (a) ‘consent of a data subject’; (b)
‘establishment, exercise or defence of a right or obliga-
tion in law’; (c) ‘an obligation of international public
law’; (d) ‘historical, statistical or research’; and (e) ‘in-
formation [. . .] deliberately [. . .] made public by the
data subject’. Processing of special personal information
may be carried out where at least one of these exemp-
tions applies.
However, it should be noted that the ‘historical, sta-
tistical or research’ exemption is subject to further con-
ditions. Section 27(1)(d) stipulates that the exemption
is applicable only to the extent that: (a) ‘the purpose
serves a public interest and the processing is necessary
for the purpose concerned’; or (b) ‘it appears to be im-
possible or would involve a disproportionate effort to
ask for consent’. In either case, ‘guarantees [must be]
provided for to ensure that the processing does not ad-
versely affect the individual privacy of the data subject
to a disproportionate extent’.
It is clear that while research activities may generally
benefit from the research exemption, the POPIA treats
those serving a public interest differently from those
not.23 If the processing concerned proves to be neces-
sary for a public interest, it would be authorized pro-
vided that safeguards are put in place. In the absence of
a public interest, however, the general prohibition
would be lifted only where it is impractical to obtain
consent from the data subject.
In other words, where research activities do not have
a public interest element, consent would be the privi-
leged legal basis for processing sensitive data. The re-
search exemption itself, in contrast, applies only when
seeking consent proves unfeasible. To the extent that
researchers are required to ask data subjects for consent
as far as possible, consent enjoys a favoured position in
the context of using sensitive data for research purposes
that are not otherwise in the public interest.
17 Anneliese Roos, ‘Data Protection Law in South Africa’ in Alex Makulilo
(ed), African Data Privacy Laws (Springer, Cham 2016) 189–227.
18 Linda Nordling, ‘South African Law May Impede Human Health
Research’ (2019) 363(6429) Science 802; Ciara Staunton and Elizabeth de
Stadler, ‘Protection of Personal Information Act No. 4 of 2013:
Implications for Biobanks’ (2019) 109(4) South African Med J 232–34.
19 See eg Department of Health, Ethics in Health Research: Principles,
Processes and Structures (2nd edn, Government of South Africa 2015).
20 Ciara Staunton and others, ‘Safeguarding the Future of Genomic
Research in South Africa: Broad Consent and the Protection of Personal
Information Act No. 4 of 2013’ (2019) 109(7) South African Med J 468–
70.
21 Protection of Personal Information Act, 2013 [hereinafter POPIA], s 26.
22 Ibid.
23 See also Santa Slokenberga and others, ‘EU Data Transfer Rules and
African Legal Realities: Is Data Exchange for Biobank Research Realistic?’
(2019) 9(1) Int Data Privacy L 30–48.
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For researchers whose use of sensitive data is subject
to the POPIA, this means they will have to first establish
whether their research activities serve a public interest.
If so, they may choose to obtain consent from the data
subject, or rely solely on the research exemption. If not,
they must prioritize consent as the primary legal basis,
and only when this turns out to be impractical can they
rely on the research exemption.
Such a ‘two-track’ system perhaps mirrors the diffi-
culty in striking a fair balance between protecting and
promoting the privacy interests of data subjects, the
public interests involved in scientific research, and the
hybrid interests represented by privately-commissioned
research activities. Indeed, the research exemption had
gone through significant changes in the course of legis-
lating the POPIA. A recommended proposal drafted by
the South African Law Reform Commission as part of
its 2005 Discussion Paper included a research exemp-
tion, but a highly restricted one.24 It set out four condi-
tions that had to be all fulfilled at the same time: (1) the
research is in the public interest; (2) processing sensitive
information is necessary for the research; (3) it is im-
practical to obtain explicit consent; and (4) safeguards
are in place to protect the data subject’s privacy.
However, after a public consultation, the
Commission removed this clause in its 2009 Final
Report.25 It is not clear why the research exemption was
taken out, but in a different section addressing informa-
tion concerning the data subject’s health and sex life,
the Commission cited extensively materials from the
World Medical Association, the British Medical
Association, and the Canadian Medical Association to
highlight the importance of consent in the context of
medical research.26
This changed position was adopted in the
Government’s Bill tabled in the same year.27 Yet, the re-
search exemption was re-introduced in a later draft by a
committee of the National Assembly.28 In this version,
however, the restrictions were somewhat watered down
compared to the 2005 proposal. Under the amended bill
(and the final version of the POPIA), the four
conditions do not apply accumulatively anymore, but
instead in a more selective manner: use of sensitive in-
formation can be based either on the public interest ele-
ment—conditions (1) and (2)—or on the fact that it
would involve an unreasonable effort to obtain con-
sent—condition (3). Either way, guarantees must be
given that the data subject’s privacy is not affected dis-
proportionately—condition (4). These changes
throughout the legislative process may be the result of
the complicated balancing of various stakeholders’
interests.29
The UK’s Data Protection Act 2018
Within the general framework of the GDPR, the UK has
enacted its Data Protection Act (DPA) 2018 to give ef-
fect and clarification to a number of the former’s provi-
sions, including the use of sensitive data for research
purposes.30 It should be noted that the DPA 2018 also
implements the EU’s Law Enforcement Directive31 and
addresses issues outside the scope of EU law.32 As far as
the matters covered by the GDPR are concerned, the
DPA 2018 is mostly aligned to the EU standard, includ-
ing, for example, the definition of sensitive data (‘special
categories of personal data’). While scientific and histor-
ical research remain an exemption to the general prohi-
bition on processing of sensitive data, the DPA 2018 has
laid down additional conditions upon which research
activities may benefit from the exemption.
Schedule 1 makes provision about the conditions for
lawful uses of sensitive data. Paragraph 4 of the
Schedule covers research-related uses, and provides that
processing of sensitive data is allowed only if the proc-
essing ‘(a) is necessary for archiving purposes, scientific
or historical research purposes or statistical purposes,
(b) is carried out in accordance with Article 89(1) of the
GDPR (as supplemented by section 19), and (c) is in
the public interest’. Points (a) and (b) are essentially a
reiteration of what is already required under the GDPR,
whereas point (c) has in effect imposed a new restriction
beyond that set out by the GDPR. Unlike the GDPR,
24 South African Law Reform Commission, ‘Discussion Paper 109: Privacy
and Data Protection’ (2005) p. 105, available at <http://www.justice.gov.
za/salrc/dpapers/dp109.pdf> last accessed 5 December 2019.
25 South African Law Reform Commission, ‘Privacy and Data Protection’
(2009) p 321–22, available at <http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_
prj124_privacy%20and%20data%20protection2009.pdf> last accessed 5
December 2019.
26 Ibid 308–14.
27 Protection of Personal Information Bill (B9-2009), available at <https://
www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/b9-09.pdf> last
accessed 5 December 2019.
28 Protection of Personal Information Bill (B9B-2009), available at
<https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/b9b2009.
pdf> last accessed 5 December 2019.
29 For a general discussion of the potentially conflicting interests in the con-
text of health research, see Nikolaus Forgo´, ‘My Health Data—Your
Research: Some Preliminary Thoughts on Different Values in the General
Data Protection Regulation’ (2015) 5(1) Int Data Privacy L 54–63.
30 Data Protection Act 2018 [hereinafter DPA 2018], s 10.
31 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offen-
ces or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of
such data, and repealing Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA OJ
2016 L 119/89.
32 DPA 2018, pt 2 ch 3 & pt 3.
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where the public interest requirement applies only to ar-
chiving purposes but not research or statistical pur-
poses, the DPA 2018 mandates such a requirement for
all three types of processing.
For health researchers wishing to use sensitive data
for research purposes, this means a public interest must
be established before they can rely on the research ex-
emption. Otherwise, a different exemption (ie lawful
basis) will need to be identified so as to justify their
processing of sensitive data.
Neither the DPA 2018 itself nor the Information
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) Guide on the GDPR pro-
vides further clarification on what would constitute a
public interest in the context of research. However, the
ICO’s Guide makes it clear that the research exemption
‘does not apply to the processing of personal data for
commercial research purposes such as market research
or customer satisfaction surveys’.33 However, this
should not be interpreted in too narrow a sense, consid-
ering that ‘substantial public interest’ forms a separate
lawful basis for processing of sensitive data.34
To the extent that the DPA 2018 provides special
treatment to research activities in the public interest, it
has effectively created a ‘two-track’ system akin to the
one under South Africa’s POPIA. However, for research
projects that do not serve a public interest, the DPA
2018 is clearly more stringent than the POPIA in that
no further derogation is provided in cases where seeking
consent from data subjects proves impossible or im-
practical. In other words, consent is treated as the privi-
leged—or as the case may be, the only—legal basis for
uses of sensitive data by research projects that are not in
the public interest.
We note that there are other relevant laws in the UK
that govern data for health research purposes and that
the GDPR applies to long-standing domestic legal and
regulatory schemes that govern the use of personal data
and the common law duty of confidentiality. Data pro-
tection law operates closely with the law of confidential-
ity. Regarding the latter, healthcare professionals are
under both ethical and legal duties to protect patients’
personal information from improper disclosure.
Confidentiality is an important ethical and legal duty
but it is not absolute.35 Healthcare professionals may
disclose personal (patient) data without breaching the
duty of confidentiality when, among other justifications,
the disclosure is permitted or has been approved under
a statutory process that sets aside the common law duty
of confidentiality.
Specifically, in England and Wales, Regulation 5 of
the Health Service (Control of Patient Information)
Regulations 2002 and Section 251 of the NHS Act 2006
(originally Section 60 of the Health and Social Care Act
2001) provides the statutory power to enable NHS pa-
tient identifiable information to be used for prescribed
purposes without the consent of patients and without
being in breach of the common law duty of confidenti-
ality. The governance of this process is, at least in
England and Wales, under the control of the Health
Research Authority (HRA), which was formally estab-
lished as an executive non-departmental public body
under the Care Act 2014. Where confidential patient in-
formation is to be shared with patient consent, approval
would normally be subject to an HRA-approved NHS
research ethics committee (REC); use of NHS patient
data for health research without patient consent would
require a favourable NHS REC opinion and HRA ap-
proval through the guidance it receives from its
Confidentiality Advisory Group. In Scotland and
Northern Ireland, there are no specific laws governing
use of patient data without consent; in these two
nations, the common law dictates. Determinations are
made by the Public Benefit and Privacy Panel for Health
and Social Care in Scotland, and in Northern Ireland by
Medical Directors of individual Health and Social Care
Trusts on a case-by-case basis.
Another example of sector-specific legislation gov-
erning the use of personal data for research purposes in
the UK is the Digital Economy Act (DEA) 2017. Under
Chapter 5 of Part 5 of the DEA 2017, ‘personal informa-
tion’ (which may include personal data36) held by a
public authority ‘may be disclosed to another person for
the purposes of research which is being or is to be car-
ried out’, provided that certain conditions are met.37
Although such disclosure must not contradict the DPA
2018,38 it is believed that the DEA 2017 has in effect
provided a legal basis for qualified sharing of personal
information and consent by the data subject is therefore
not needed.39
While some of these laws and arrangements set aside
the common law duty of confidentiality, they do not set
aside the need to comply with other legislation or the
principles of data protection law. Even if a disclosure of
otherwise confidential patient data, for example, is
33 ICO, Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (n 14), p
284.
34 GDPR, Art 9(2)(j); DPA 2018, s 10(1)(b).
35 See generally General Medical Council (GMC), Confidentiality: Good
Practice in Handling Patient Information (2017, updated 2018).
36 For a detailed discussion of the interactions between the DEA 2017, the
DPA 2018, and the GDPR, see Bell and others (n 5).
37 DEA 2017, s 64.
38 Ibid s 65(2).
39 Bell and others (n 5) 47.
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permitted under the common law, the disclosure must
still satisfy the requirements of data protection law. This
means that there also still needs to be a legal basis under
the GDPR (and DPA 2018) for processing personal
data—which necessarily in this context would not be
consent of the data subject. More importantly, the DPA
2018 remains the primary legal baseline for processing
of personal data for health research in the absence of lex
specialis. Research projects that do not source ‘patient
information’ from the NHS or ‘personal information’
from a public authority will be subject to the DPA 2018.
Thus, our foregoing analysis in regards to the scope of
and value placed on the lawful basis of consent under
UK data protection law still applies, including in the
context of processing patient data for health research.
And in this sense, these long-standing laws are not su-
perseded by the DPA 2018; indeed, they complement
each other.
The Irish Health Research Regulations 2018
Ireland’s Data Protection Act 2018 gives national effect
to aspects of the GDPR that are specific to Ireland, in-
cluding conditions for data processing for research pur-
poses. Section 36 of that Act enables the government to
enact Regulations to, among other things, identify addi-
tional suitable and specific measures regarding the ex-
plicit consent of the data subject for the processing of
their personal data for one or more specified purposes.
To that end, the Health Research Regulations 2018,
which came into force in August 2018, establish six key
points regarding processing of personal data for health
research. They:
1. outline the mandatory suitable and specific meas-
ures for the processing of personal data for the pur-
poses of health research (Regulation 3(1));
2. provide a definition of health research for the pur-
poses of the regulation (Regulation 3(2));
3. provide for the possibility of applying for a consent
declaration for new research (Regulation 5);
4. provide for transitional arrangements in respect of
the granting of consent declarations for health re-
search that is already underway (Regulation 6);
5. provide for the establishment and operation of a
committee of persons to make decisions on applica-
tions for consent declarations, including an appeals
process (Regulation 7-13 and Schedule); and
6. include a number of miscellaneous provisions
(Regulations 14–16).
Health research is defined broadly in the Regulations to
include any of the following scientific research for the
purpose of human health, and unlike the sector-specific
UK legislation discussed above—namely the Health
Service (Control of Patient Information) Regulations
2002, the NHS Act 2006, and the DEA 2017—is not lim-
ited to data held by a health service or public authority:
(i) research with the goal of understanding normal
and abnormal functioning at molecular, cellular,
organ system and whole body levels;
(ii) research that is specifically concerned with innova-
tive strategies, devices, products or services for the
diagnosis, treatment or prevention of human dis-
ease or injury;
(iii) research with the goal of improving the diagnosis
and treatment (including the rehabilitation and
palliation) of human disease and injury and of im-
proving the health and quality of life of
individuals;
(iv) research with the goal of improving the efficiency
and effectiveness of health professionals and the
health care system; and
(v) research with the goal of improving the health of
the population as a whole or any part of the popu-
lation through a better understanding of the ways
in which social, cultural, environmental, occupa-
tional and economic factors determine health
status.40
Unlike the GDPR, the Health Research Regulations
2018 privilege consent for data processing in the health
research context by placing a rebuttable presumption
on the data controller that explicit consent should be
the operating legal basis. Specifically, Regulation 3(1)(e)
states that:
A controller who is processing or further processing per-
sonal data for the purposes of health research shall ensure
that the following suitable and specific measures are taken
to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
data subject:
[. . .] explicit consent has been obtained from the data subject,
prior to the commencement of the health research, for the
processing of his or her personal data for the purpose of speci-
fied health research, either in relation to a particular area or
more generally in that area or a related area of health re-
search, or part thereof.41
40 Data Protection Act 2018 (Section 36(2)) (Health Research) Regulations
2018), SI No 314 of 2018 (Ireland), Regulation 3(2)(a) [hereinafter
Health Research Regulations 2018].
41 Emphasis added.
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A relatively narrow carve-out is permitted for control-
lers to forego having to obtain a data subject’s explicit
consent.42 Regulation 5(1) states that:
A controller proposing to process or further process
personal data for the purposes of health research [. . .] may
apply to the [Health Research Consent Declaration
Committee . . .] for a declaration where he or she is of the
view that the public interest in carrying out the research
significantly outweighs the public interest in requiring the
explicit consent of the data subject [. . .].
A controller making an application to the Committee
must, prior to making the application, (a) carry out a
data protection impact assessment in accordance with
Article 35(1) of the GDPR, and (b) obtain ethics ap-
proval of the health research from a research ethics
committee.43 Moreover, the controller must furnish to
the Committee a great deal of information as part of the
application, specifically:
1. Written information that clearly identifies—
(i) that the controller has a valid and lawful basis for
the processing of the personal data, and
(ii) that the controller meets one of the conditions in
Article 9(2) of the GDPR;
2. Written information that clearly identifies the con-
troller and, where there are joint controllers, the di-
vision of responsibilities within the meaning of
Article 26 of the GDPR;
3. Written information demonstrating that—
(i) the health research requires that personal data
of a type specified be obtained and processed
rather than anonymized data,
(ii) the personal data will not be processed in such
a way that damage or distress is, or is likely to
be, caused to the data subject,
(iii) the collection and use of the personal data will
go no further than is necessary for the attain-
ment of the research objective,
(iv) there will be no disclosure of the personal data
unless that disclosure is required by law or the
data subject has given his or her explicit consent
to the disclosure,
(v) measures set out in Regulation 3(1)(b)(iv) to
(vii), 3(1)(c)(iii) to (viii) and 3(1)(d) have been
identified and will be put in place before the
health research commences,
(vi) a data protection officer has been appointed in
relation to the health research, and
(vii) ethics approval from a research ethics commit-
tee has been received;
4. A copy of the result of the data protection impact as-
sessment that has been carried out, with particular
reference to the possibility of data linkages and
details of any consultations undertaken with poten-
tial data subjects; and
5. Written information demonstrating that the public
interest in carrying out the health research signifi-
cantly outweighs the public interest in requiring the
explicit consent of the data subject under Regulation
3(1)(e) together with a statement setting out the rea-
sons why it is not proposed to seek the consent of the
data subject for the purposes of the health research.
This means that a researcher may apply for a declara-
tion that explicit consent is not required only if, in the
case of a new health research project, the public interest
of the research ‘significantly outweighs’ the public inter-
est in requiring the explicit consent of the individual
whose data are being processed (Regulation 5(1)). The
language of ‘may’ rather than ‘must’ in Regulation 5(1)
suggests that an application for such a declaration is not
legally required, but evidences a strong assurance of
compliance. Indeed, Regulation 3(1)(d) states that a
controller who is processing or further processing per-
sonal data for the purposes of health research ‘shall’ en-
sure that ‘explicit consent has been obtained from the
data subject, prior to the commencement of the health
research, for the processing of their personal data for
the purpose of specified health research, either in rela-
tion to a particular area or more generally in that area
or a related area of health research, or part thereof’.
Thus, it appears that the only way researchers can work
around the requirement for explicit consent is to apply
for a declaration from the Health Research Consent
Declaration Committee.
Some commentators have expressed alarm that, given
the onerous burden to obtain explicit consent in some
large-scale data-intensive studies and the uncertainty of
successfully obtaining a waiver from the Health
Research Consent Declaration Committee, these
Regulations will have a detrimental impact on several
areas of health research in Ireland, including retrospec-
tive chart reviews, biobanks, and research with individu-
als who lack capacity to consent.44 Moreover,
42 A second carve-out not relevant for the purposes of this article is that the
data controller obtained the consent of the data subject to the processing
of the data under the Data Protection Acts 1988 and 2003 and that this
consent has not been withdrawn.
43 Health Research Regulations 2018, Regulation 5(3).
44 Niamh Clarke and others, ‘GDPR: An Impediment to Research?’ (2019)
188(4) Irish J Med Sci 1129–35.
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researchers seeking to avail themselves of the exemption
likely will find the task arduous, given the amount of in-
formation to be provided with the application to the
Committee and the conditions to be fulfilled in advance
of the application. Indeed, in our view, few research
projects will be able to obtain a consent waiver from the
Committee. A website has been set up for the
Committee, explaining its remit as thus:
The [Health Research] Regulations make explicit consent
the default position for processing personal data for health
research. In other words, a health researcher planning to
use an individual’s information for health research must
obtain the explicit consent of the individual to do so. This
is about empowering the patient in relation to his or her
medical records.
However, it is recognised—as it is in other countries—that
sometimes, in limited situations, obtaining consent will not
be possible and that the public interest of doing the research
significantly outweighs the need for explicit consent. It is in
cases like this that HRCDC has a decision making role.
[. . .]
In order that such applications are carefully considered
from a range of perspectives, the Health Research
Regulations provide for an independent and representative
committee to make decisions on those applications—that is
the role of the HRCDC.
In everything that we do, our objective will be to seek to
build Transparency, Confidence and Trust.45
Time will tell whether the Health Research Regulations
2018 are successful based on generally agreed parame-
ters of regulatory assessment.46 In the following section,
we argue that these Regulations fail to achieve a suitable
balance among the interests of various stakeholders,
foremost data subjects (research participants) and the
research community, and mandate (explicit) consent to
a disproportionate degree.
Consent for data processing: quo vadis?
Divergence across a spectrum of recent laws
The three national laws discussed in the previous section
represent different approaches to regulating the use of sen-
sitive data in the context of health research, and conse-
quently have varying degrees of impact on projects
involving collection and use of data. Under each of the
POPIA, the DPA 2018, and the Irish Health Research
Regulations 2018, scientific research may qualify as an ex-
emption, parallel to data subjects’ consent, from the gen-
eral prohibition on processing of personal data. In other
words, at least some categories of health research activities
involving the use of sensitive data, irrespective of the ac-
tual applicable law among the three, would be allowed
even without (explicit) consent from the data subject.
However, the differences in the conditions and restrictions
imposed on the research exemption show a nuanced di-
vergence of the policy choice regarding the extent to which
consent should be treated as a favoured option.
As an overarching regulatory framework, the GDPR’s
default position shows little regulatory preference (or
‘bias’) to consent as the appropriate protective measure
in the case of research. Under Article 9(2), explicit con-
sent is but one of the exemptions equally available to
researchers. They can either rely on Article 9(2)(a)—by
obtaining explicit consent from the data subject—or
more likely on Article 9(2)(j)—by putting in place safe-
guards in accordance with Article 89(1) based on EU or
Member State law.47 There is almost no compliance in-
centive for researchers to choose consent over the re-
search exemption to legitimize their processing of
sensitive data under the GDPR.
Turning to national laws, we see that the Irish Health
Research Regulations 2018 represent a starkly different
approach that strongly favours (explicit) consent as the
primary choice of safeguard.48 As analysed above, ex-
plicit consent from data subjects for processing their
data forms a mandatory part of the measures to be
taken by health researchers. Such a requirement is
exempted only if it can be established that the interest
in seeking explicit consent is ‘significantly outweigh[ed]’
by the public interest in carrying out the research. To
ascertain this is the case, researchers would need to ap-
ply for a declaration from the Health Research Consent
Declaration Committee to expressly state such an over-
riding public interest. As noted above, the application
process is onerous. This essentially creates a major moti-
vation for researchers to seek explicit consent from data
subjects so as to avoid the substantive and procedural
burdens involved in the application for a consent
waiver. For health research projects unable to demon-
strate a compelling public interest, obtaining explicit
consent would be the only option.
We also see more moderate options adopted by
South Africa’s POPIA and the UK’s DPA 2018. Under
both regimes, processing of sensitive data for research
45 Health Research Consent Declaration Committee, ‘About Us’, available
at <https://hrcdc.ie/about-us/> last accessed 5 December 2019.
46 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave, and Martin Lodge, Understanding
Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (2nd edn, OUP 2012).
47 It should be noted that in jurisdictions subject to the GDPR, data proc-
essing activities based on consent are nevertheless subject to the safe-
guards set out by Art 89(1).
48 See also Donnelly and McDonagh (n 10).
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purposes are treated differently depending on whether a
public interest can be identified. With a public interest
element, such processing would be allowed, provided
that certain safeguards are in place, with no need for ex-
plicit consent from data subjects or a formal consent
waiver from a committee. Without such a public inter-
est element, the research exemption would no longer
apply and consent would be the only available compli-
ance option. Consent therefore constitutes a privileged
justification under both the South African and the UK
legislation for uses of sensitive data for research pur-
poses to the extent that it is required for research activi-
ties that are not in the public interest. Both regimes
reflect the regulatory preference for consent, especially
in the absence of a public interest element, although
such a preference is not as strong as the one under the
Irish Regulations. Yet, there is a further degree of diver-
gence between the POPIA and the DPA 2018 when it
comes to research activities that do not fulfil the public
interest requirement. Under Section 27(7)(d) of the
POPIA, such activities will be nevertheless exempted in-
sofar as ‘it appears to be impossible or would involve a
disproportionate effort to ask for consent’, a proviso
not provided by the DPA 2018.
With the key differences embodied in the approaches
of the three pieces of legislation compared above, it
becomes evident how they represent a range of policy
choices in terms of the privileged status of consent in
safeguarding health research uses of personal data. Such
differences are summarized in Table 1.
It should, however, be emphasized that certain spe-
cific requirements or exceptional cases in each of the
statutes have been intentionally simplified for the pur-
pose of comparison here. The general safeguards set out
by Article 89(1) GDPR are specified differently under
the Irish and UK implementations, and are clearly more
detailed than the ‘sufficient guarantees’ required by
Section 27(1)(d) POPIA. And, under Section 19(3) of
the DPA 2018, research uses of personal data for ‘meas-
ures or decisions with respect to a particular data sub-
ject’ are allowed only if approved by a research ethics
committee. The omission of such details in the discus-
sion above does not mean that they are unimportant,
but a simplified description of each of the regulatory
models has the benefit of enabling us to highlight the
principal differences in legislative approaches, as well as
the underlying policy considerations regarding the mer-
its of consent in research activities. Such a comparison
would in turn provide a helpful analytical framework
for us to reflect on the appropriate approach to achieve
the best balance among the interests of various stake-
holders, including data subjects, the public, and the re-
search community.
Finding an appropriate balance among various
stakeholder interests
As mentioned briefly in our introduction and section
on the GDPR, there is some concern of a conflation be-
tween research ethics consent and data processing con-
sent. Research ethics consent, often termed ‘informed
consent’, is a powerful ethical-legal norm in most forms
of health research involving human participants. It is
considered to be the primary means by which research-
ers accord respect to participants, and in turn, it is seen
as a manifestation of participants’ individual autonomy
and a means to protect their dignity and bodily integ-
rity.50 Consider, for example, Article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
which states that "no one shall be subjected without his
free consent to medical or scientific experimentation."
Table 1. Comparison of recent data protection statutes regarding data processing consent for health research
purposes
Legislation Conditions for exemption from
obtaining data processing consent49
Privileged status of data
processing consent
POPIA (South Africa) Public interest or impracticability to
obtain consent (controller assessed)
Moderately privileged
DPA 2018 (UK) Public interest (controller assessed) Moderately privileged
Health Research
Regulations
2018 (Ireland)
Significant public interest and consent
waiver declaration (independently
assessed by third party)
Strongly privileged
49 The conditions listed here do not include the general safeguards applied
to processing of personal data for research purposes.
50 For additional values of consent in the context of research, see Neil
Manson and Onora O’Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics
(CUP 2007) 69–96.
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Through the consent form, participants signal in an evi-
dentiary manner whether or not they choose to partici-
pate in a research project by, for example, providing
biological samples and/or personal data.51
But for the purposes of data protection law, we must,
foremost for reasons of conceptual clarity, distinguish
(informed) consent to participation in a research proj-
ect from consent as the legal basis for processing per-
sonal data. In the former case, a research ethics
committee likely will require that the researcher obtain
the informed consent of participants prior to conduct-
ing the research, through, for example, provision of an
information sheet and securing signature on a form.
And, as mentioned, consent to participation may be a
legal obligation in some jurisdictions for certain types of
health research, such as clinical trials involving drugs or
devices. Consent to process personal data, however,
may not be a legal or ethical obligation per se under
data protection law. We have some concern that failure
to make this distinction between research ethics consent
and data processing consent explicit will exacerbate a
misconception among participants and researchers alike
such that the participants’ consent to participate in a re-
search project de facto equates to a consent to (also)
process their personal data. We term this ‘consent mis-
conception’, a scenario whereby because consent is the
favoured mechanism and key ethico-legal norm in re-
search ethics governance, it is perceived that it must
also be the case for data protection purposes. While it
may be the case that researchers will want to rely on
consent as a lawful basis to process data (or as we see in
Ireland’s case, it may have to be the case), nevertheless,
for a variety of reasons, foremost scientific and method-
ological, but also ethical and legal, researchers may want
to rely on another lawful basis if alternatives are
available.
Indeed, the UK’s General Medical Council has
opined that:
It will not always be appropriate for data controllers to rely
on consent under GDPR as a condition for processing
health data. For example, implied consent is an accepted
concept under the law of confidentiality, but it is unlikely
to be a sufficient basis for sharing personal data based on
consent under Article 6(1)(a) of the GDPR, and will not be
sufficient for sharing ‘special category data’ based on ex-
plicit consent under Article 9(2)(a) of the GDPR. However,
the GDPR does provide alternative conditions for process-
ing data which are likely to be more appropriate in a health
context. This means that a doctor who is a data controller
may be relying on different legal justifications for disclosing
information under the common law duty of confidence
and under the GDPR.52
Similarly, the European Data Protection Board has
commented in the context of clinical trials research that:
15. . . . the informed consent foreseen under the CTR [EU
Clinical Trials Regulation No 536/2014] must not be con-
fused with the notion of consent as a legal ground for the
processing of personal data under the GDPR. [. . .]
16. The obligation to obtain the informed consent of partic-
ipants in a clinical trial is primarily a measure to ensure the
protection of the right to human dignity and the right to
integrity of individuals under Article 1 and 3 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the EU; it is not conceived as an
instrument for data protection compliance.
[. . .]
20. However, it must be kept in mind that even though
conditions for an informed consent under the CTR are
gathered, a clear situation of imbalance of powers between
the participant and the sponsor/investigator will imply that
the consent is not ‘freely given’ in the meaning of the
GDPR. As a matter of example, the EDPB considers that
this will be the case when a participant is not in good health
conditions, when participants belong to an economically or
socially disadvantaged group or in any situation of institu-
tional or hierarchical dependency. Therefore, and as
explained in the Guidelines on consent of the Working
Party 29, consent will not be the appropriate legal basis in
most cases, and other legal bases than consent must be re-
lied upon [. . .].
21. Consequently, the EDPB considers that data controllers
should conduct a particularly thorough assessment of the
circumstances of the clinical trial before relying on individ-
uals’ consent as a legal basis for the processing of personal
data for the purposes of the research activities of that
trial.53
Moreover, even outside the clinical trials research con-
text, many would see mandating or otherwise strongly
privileging consent as the lawful basis in the health re-
search context as problematic for at least two reasons.
First, the interpretation of consent and what forms a
valid consent and how it is to be recorded differs not
only between the fields of data protection and research
ethics, but also across countries (eg what is ‘informed’,
how ‘broad’ can a broad consent be), potentially dis-
rupting international research collaboration.54 Second,
the possibility of a withdrawal of consent for data
51 Graeme Laurie and Emily Postan, ‘Rhetoric or Reality: What is the Legal
Status of the Consent Form in Health-related Research?’ (2013) 21(3)
Med L Rev 371–414.
52 GMC, Confidentiality (n 35) 61.
53 EDPB, Opinion 3/2019 (n 9).
54 Menno Mostert and others, ‘Big Data in Medical Research and EU Data
Protection Law: Challenges to the Consent or Anonymise Approach’
(2016) 24(7) Eur J Human Genetics 956–60.
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processing (which is obligatory under Article 7 of the
GDPR) will complicate the situation where data must
be removed from a repository. If consent is used as the
lawful basis for processing data and a research partici-
pant withdraws consent, the controller will no longer
have a lawful basis to process personal data about them,
unless the data are also processed for another purpose
which justifies retention without consent.55 This is dis-
tinct from consent for participation in a research proj-
ect, where it is feasible that such withdrawal will not
affect research activities already carried out and the use
of data obtained based on consent before its
withdrawal.
An added complication between research ethics
consent and data processing consent is the demarca-
tion of each in information sheets and consent forms.
Article 7(2) of the GDPR states: ‘If the data subject’s
consent is given in the context of a written declaration
which also concerns other matters, the request for
consent shall be presented in a manner which is clearly
distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligi-
ble and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language.’ This would oblige controllers to be particu-
larly careful in distinguishing consent for participation
in health research from consent for data processing
during the consent process and in any information
sheets and consent forms provided to participants/
data subjects.56 Arguably, there would also be a need
to explicitly include the identity of all parties relying
on the consent.
All this said, we nevertheless consider consent to be
a manifestly stronger legal form for data subjects (and
participants) to exercise their autonomy over the col-
lection and use of their data, as well their participation
in a research project more generally. Consent enables
individuals to exercise some degree of control over
their body and bodily integrity, of which personal data
forms a crucial component. Enabling data subjects to
provide consent demonstrates respect for them as data
subjects and also establishes a communicative bond be-
tween the controller and the subject, whereby both can
inform the other of their interests, rights, and duties.
For these reasons, as a general principle, we think con-
sent should be privileged to a degree in the research
provisions of data protection law, but in a moderate
and rebuttable form.
Thus, we do not support the current default data
protection model in Europe, reflected in the GDPR,
because in our view, it privileges the interests of those
conducting health research to too great an extent. While
it does limit the potential for consent misconception, as
researchers may avail themselves of other lawful bases
and must make the selected basis explicitly known to
data subjects, there is concern that researchers will de
facto resort to an alternative lawful basis even when it is
relatively easy to obtain consent from the data subject.
In our view, if obtaining consent is not onerous, is ethi-
cally appropriate in the research project at hand, and
will not present serious methodological problems to the
project, consent should be obtained. This is, in particu-
lar, the case when it comes to privately-commissioned
research that may not serve a clear public interest.
Under the GDPR’s broad definition of research activi-
ties, the indiscriminate authorization of processing sen-
sitive data for research purposes may lead to potential
abuses of this exemption by private entities.57 Without
any privileged position afforded to the lawful basis of
consent under the GDPR, researchers likely will gravi-
tate to the research provisions under Articles 9(2)(j)
and 89(1).
For somewhat similar reasons, we also do not sup-
port the model espoused by Ireland’s Health Research
Regulations 2018. Here, consent is privileged to too
great an extent. We share the concern from many in the
research community that by mandating explicit consent,
subject only to a committee waiver whereby it is dem-
onstrated that (among other things) the public interest
in carrying out the research ‘significantly outweighs’ the
public interest in requiring the explicit consent of the
data subject, many health research projects will be sub-
ject to disproportionate, burdensome regulation that
will dampen health research activity in the country. This
will come at a cost to research competitiveness and pa-
tient access to innovative diagnostics, drugs, and devi-
ces. We see greater merit in self-assessment (and
accountability to a regulator)—in other words, a frame-
work under which the data controller/researcher under-
takes an assessment of whether consent should be the
lawful basis—than an independent third-party assess-
ment that creates unnecessary bureaucratic burden. The
rationale for promoting consent in data protection law
for health research purposes is sound, but the means by
which it is operationalized in Ireland are not. Consent is
not the only means by which patients can be ‘empow-
ered’ in relation to their medical records, and as we
have stressed, the absence of consent does not
55 Art 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/
679, p 22.
56 See also Art 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the
notion of legitimate interests of the data controller under Art 7 of
Directive 95/26/EC, European Commission, 9 April 2014, p 28.
57 Pormeister (n 15).
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necessarily contradict the values of ethical research.58
Additionally, we note that data subject access rights to
these records are provided for already in data protection
law and are not contingent on consent as the lawful basis.
We support to a greater degree the approach taken
by the UK’s DPA 2018, but consider it relatively difficult
to make a public interest justification for health research
in all instances. A benefit of the DPA 2018 compared to
Ireland’s Health Research Regulations 2018 is that the
determination of public interest is made by the control-
ler (researcher), not an independent committee to
which a number of materials must be compiled and
submitted, which, as we have said, is in our view overly
bureaucratic. If a controller deems research to be in the
public interest when in fact it is not, the data protection
authority (eg the UK’s ICO) is empowered to intervene.
We think this approach is more sensible and propor-
tionate: the research community should engage in this
form of co-regulation, which demonstrates presumed
trust by the regulator, rather than command-and-
control regulation that demands relatively inflexible
rules-based compliance by the research community.
Ultimately, the approach we advocate tacks most
closely to that of South Africa’s POPIA. Under this
middle-ground model, consent as the lawful basis would
be privileged unless the research purpose serves a public
interest (as determined by the controller) and the proc-
essing is necessary for the purpose concerned, or obtain-
ing consent from data subjects appears to be impossible
or it would involve a disproportionate effort to ask for
consent. In either case, guarantees must be provided to
ensure that the processing does not adversely affect the
individual privacy of the data subject to a disproportion-
ate extent. In our view, this model achieves the best bal-
ance between the various stakeholder interests at play.
Data subjects (who are also research participants) are
respected in that an obligation to obtain their consent is
privileged—the operating assumption is that consent
should be the lawful basis for processing their personal
data. At the same time, consent is not mandated and
subject to very narrow exemptions, as the Irish model
would espouse. Rather, the onus is placed on the re-
searcher (as data controller) to make an honest, in-
formed determination about the burdens of obtaining
consent or the public interest justifications for forgoing
consent. This grounds data processing consent in self-
assessment (and accountability to a regulator) rather
than bureaucratic burden and submission to a third
party, enabling the researcher to determine when
consent is impracticable or the research purpose serves a
public interest and the processing is necessary for the
purpose concerned, thereby opening the door to seeking
other lawful bases to process personal data.
This approach does not displace the possibility that
there may be a requirement for consent under another
legal duty (eg the English duty of confidence) or re-
search ethics obligations. Nonetheless, our preference is
to hold these requirements distinct from data protection
law for reasons of conceptual clarity. We would be bet-
ter served to limit the risk of conceptual confusion re-
garding the data protection requirement that processing
be ‘lawful’ when considering, for example, the intersec-
tion of the law of confidence and data protection law,
or the intersection with any requirements for consent
from the perspective of research ethics.
We do not think South Africa’s approach is perfect.
While it mandates guarantees from the controller to en-
sure that the processing does not adversely affect the in-
dividual privacy of the data subject to a
disproportionate extent, it lacks requirements on proce-
dural and substantive safeguards to protect data subject
rights. A ‘South Africaþ’ model would combine the
choice it currently provides (public interest justification
for forgoing consent or impracticability to obtain con-
sent) with enhanced procedural and substantive safe-
guards, similar to those stipulated in the GDPR. These
safeguards would include technical and organizational
measures, such as strongly encouraging anonymization
and pseudonymization where possible; having a data
protection officer in circumstances where the core activ-
ities of the controller or the processor consist of proc-
essing genomic or health-related data on a large scale;
and having a data protection impact assessment under-
taken in circumstances where the processing involves
new technologies, or, taking into account the nature,
scope, context and purposes of the processing, is likely
to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of
individuals. It should also include transparency in the
decision-making process such that the controller makes
clearly explicit the reasons for which data processing
consent is deemed impracticable to obtain or the re-
search purpose serves a public interest, thereby overrid-
ing the consent obligation.
Conclusion
In this article, we considered the role of consent in proc-
essing data for health research. As part of this analysis,
58 Lisa Lee, Charles Heilig, and Angela White, ‘Ethical Justification for
Conducting Public Health Surveillance Without Patient Consent’ (2012)
102(1) Am J Public Health 38–44.
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we looked at several recent data protection laws—the
EU GDPR, South Africa’s POPIA, the UK’s DPA 2018,
and Ireland’s Health Research Regulations 2018—as
well as other laws that impact the use of data for health
research.
Among the various alternatives presented in the three
national laws, we find that there is merit in distinguish-
ing research ethics consent from data processing con-
sent. Failure to do so enhances the risk of consent
misconception. Data subjects (research participants)
should be under no illusions—not created by their own
doing—as to what they are consenting to and for what
purposes. The research ethics norm of consent to partic-
ipate in a project, and thereby agree to provide data
and/or samples, is powerful and should be respected.
The data protection lawful basis of consent is less pow-
erful but should be privileged as well—to a degree. It
symbolizes respect for the data subject and puts the data
subject on a more symmetrical informational and com-
municative plane with the data controller. This analysis
has led us to conclude that the regulatory framework
under the GDPR and the national approach taken by
Ireland both pull too far on opposite ends of the spec-
trum. One creates too great a risk to infringement of
data subject rights and affords researchers too much le-
verage to avoid consent even in instances where it is ap-
propriate; the other is overly burdensome,
disproportionate, and detrimentally impacts health re-
search. But, as the European Data Protection Board and
other organizations have noted, there are compelling
reasons why data processing consent may not be the ap-
propriate lawful basis in the health research context,
depending on the type of project. Context is crucial—
and the consideration of context should, in our view, be
assessed by the data controller/researcher rather than a
third party, the latter of which risks disproportionate
bureaucratic burden and undue tamping down of medi-
cal innovation.
Thus, we think a model that tacks closest to South
Africa’s POPIA achieves the best balance among the var-
ious stakeholder interests for both protecting data sub-
ject/research participant rights and interests and also
promoting socially valuable health research that can im-
prove the lives of the community. Consent for data
processing should be privileged in health research, but
researchers also should be afforded an opportunity to
forgo it in cases where it is impracticable for a given
project or the research purpose serves a public interest
and the processing is necessary for the purpose con-
cerned—and at the same time, those (and all) research-
ers should have an obligation to make their reasons for
forgoing consent transparent, and process individuals’
personal data with robust procedural and substantive
safeguards in place.
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